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Abstract
Computer  security  students  benefit  from  hands-on
experience  applying  security  tools  and  techniques  to
attack and defend vulnerable systems. Virtual machines
(VMs) provide an effective way of sharing targets for
hacking. However, developing these hacking challenges
is time consuming, and once created, essentially static.
That is, once the challenge has been "solved" there is
no  remaining  challenge  for  the  student,  and  if  the
challenge is  created for  a  competition or  assessment,
the  challenge  cannot  be  reused  without  risking
plagiarism, and collusion.
Security  Scenario  Generator  (SecGen)  can  build
complex VMs based on randomised scenarios, with a
number  of  diverse  use-cases,  including:  building
networks of VMs with randomised services and in-the-
wild vulnerabilities and with themed content, which can
form the basis of penetration testing activities; VMs for
educational  lab  use;  and  VMs with  randomised  CTF
challenges.  SecGen has a modular  architecture which
can  dynamically  generate  challenges  by  nesting
modules,  and  a  hints  generation  system,  which  is
designed  to  provide  scaffolding  for  novice  security
students  to  make  progress  on  complex  challenges.
SecGen has been used for teaching at universities, and
hosting a recent UK-wide CTF event.
1. Introduction
Computer  security  students  benefit  from  hands-on
experience  applying  security  tools  and  techniques  to
attack  and  defend  vulnerable  systems.  Practical  lab
work  and  pre-configured  hacking  challenges  are
common practice both in security education and also as
a pastime for security-minded individuals. Competitive
hacking  challenges,  such  as  Capture  the  Flag  (CTF)
competitions  have  become  a  mainstay  at  industry
conferences  and  are  the  focus  of  large  online
communities.  CTF  activities  have  been  used  in
education  as  an  effective  way  of  providing  and
assessing engaging hands-on security challenges, and is
often the focus of student hacking society activity (see
e.g.  [1]–[3]).  Virtual  machines  (VMs)  provide  an
effective way of sharing targets for hacking, and can be
designed  in  order  to  test  the  skills  of  the  attacker.
Websites  such  as  Vulnhub  [4] host  pre-configured
hacking challenge VMs and are a valuable resource for
those learning and advancing their  skills  in computer
security. However, developing these hacking challenges
is time consuming, and once created, essentially static.
That is, once the challenge has been "solved" there is
no  remaining  challenge  for  the  student,  and  if  the
challenge is  created  for  a  competition or  assessment,
the  challenge  cannot  be  reused  without  risking
plagiarism, and collusion.
Delivering  hacking  scenarios  to  students  involves  a
number  of  existing  challenges,  which  we  aim  to
overcome:  existing pre-configured hacking challenges
(such  as  Metasploitable  and  those  on  VulnHub)  are
typically static and therefore they suffer from limited
re-play and  reuse,  since they only need to  be solved
once before a solution/write-up is available; and, as a
consequence, academic or competitive assessment via
pre-developed scenarios is fraught with the risk of hard
to detect or prevent plagiarism and collusion.
The  typical  attempted  solution  to  these  issues  is  the
time-consuming  process  of  manually  configuring
hacking scenarios as vulnerable learning scenarios are
required,  typically  on  an  event-by-event  basis,
accepting that each student has the same challenge and
the same CTF flags to find.
This is not practical at scale: the network infrastructure
and staff  costs  of  running  a  single  two day  event  is
large (see e.g. [5]) and it can be argued that providing a
whole  cohort  of  students  with  appropriate  and
randomised assessment tasks, across a 12 week course
is not practical using traditional methods. 
Recently,  there  has  been  some  related  work  to
randomise security challenges or flags (such as [2], [6],
[7]); however, these approaches are focussed on adding
randomness to specific challenges or generating random
flags that are inserted into static challenges. 
We  have  created  Security  Scenario  Generator
(SecGen)1 which provides a robust framework that can
build  complex  VMs  based  on  randomised  scenarios,
with a number of diverse use-cases, including: building
networks  of  complex  VMs with  randomised  services
and in-the-wild vulnerabilities and with themed content
such as business names, employees, and so on, which
can form the basis of penetration testing activities; VMs
for educational lab use; and VMs with randomised CTF
challenges,  with  randomised  (yet  meaningful)
challenges including real-word vulnerabilities. SecGen
has a number of unique features, including a modular
architecture which can dynamically generate challenges
by  nesting  modules,  and  a  hints  generation  system,
which  is  designed  to  provide  scaffolding  for  novice
security  students  to  make  progress  on  complex
challenges.
In this paper we describe our aims, present the SecGen
framework,  including  its  architecture,  configuration
language, and use cases, and present evaluation based
on using the  system for  teaching  at  universities,  and
hosting a recent UK-wide CTF event.
2. Related Literature
Capture  The  Flag  (CTF)  competitions  have  been
popular in the computer security community since the
90s,  including  the  first  DEFCON  CTF  [8].  Other
popular  annual  CTF  competitions  include  those  that
target university students, such as CSAW CTF [9], [10]
and RuCTF [11], those that target high schools, such as
PicoCTF  [7],  [12],  others  include  Ghost  in  the
Shellcode  [13], Codegate  [14], and UCSB iCTF  [15].
The website ctftime.org  [16] tracks these CTF events
and many more, and lists thousands of teams that take
part in competitions on an almost weekly basis. Many
CTF  events  are  conducted  entirely  online,  such  as
DEFCON  CTF  Qualifiers,  and  online  CTFs  often
feature  a  write-up  submission,  while  others  are
conducted  in-person,  such  as  DEFCON  CTF,  and
typically include a live leaderboard.
The most common style of CTF is based on  jeopardy
challenges,  where competitors  are typically  presented
with a board of independant challenges, typically with
downloads of files for each challenge. Other styles of
CTF  include  attack-defence,  where  the  focus  is  on
attacking  or  defending  systems  from  attack  while
keeping services available [17]. In some cases, such as
CCDC [18], competing student teams focus entirely on
defence,  while in  other  cases,  such as  RuCTFE  [11],
teams  both  patch  and  defend  their  systems  while
attacking others. Attack-defence CTFs often distribute
vulnerable systems in the form of VMs. Various forms
of  games-based  learning  and  gamification  (such  as
1  SecGen is  free  and open source  software  (FOSS)
available at http://github.com/cliffe/SecGen
leveling-up  and  leaderboards)  have  been  applied  to
security  education  [19],  [20].  Gondree  et.  al [21]
emphasise diversity of the variety of approaches taken
and describe security games as being on a continuum
based on task variety and adversarial dynamicity (such
as  whether  teams  interact  with  each  other);  while
acknowledging that  this  is  an  over-simplification and
that many other game attributes are important. 
Capture  The  Flag  (CTF)  competitions  are  a  popular
means of  engaging students  with cyber  security.  The
pedagogical  benefits  of  CTF competitions  have  been
widely reported. Efforts to incorporate CTF in higher
education  (HE)  include  engaging  students  in  out-of-
class  CTF  activity  to  cultivate  “informal  learning
spaces”  [1], [22], delivering the lab work exercises in
the form of CTF-style challenges  [2], where flags are
revealed where tasks are completed or challenges are
solved, and Class Capture-the-Flag Exercises (CCTFs)
[23], where teams play-off against each other in regular
in-class competitions.
Challenges  in  running  CTF  events  include  the  effort
required to design and test challenges for quality and
appropriate difficulty level, especially where the aim is
to  ensure  accessibility  for  beginners  [9].  The  effort
required  to  create  challenges  and  attack  scenarios
(whether CTF-style or other vulnerable scenarios such
as  Metasploitable  or  VMs  posted  to  Vulnhub)  is
substantial, and time consuming, and as stated earlier,
essentially static, making reuse problematic.
Various  frameworks  for  hosting  CTFs  have  been
published, such as Facebook CTF (FBCTF) [24], CTFd
[25],  HackTheArch  [26],  Mellivora  [27],  NightShade
[28], and picoCTF-Platform 2  [29]. These frameworks
typically present jeopardy challenges and scoreboards,
and  provide  administrators  a  web  interface  for
managing challenges. The iCTF Framework [15] can be
used  to  host  attack-defence  CTFs,  and  can  generate
VirtualBox VMs for each team using setup scripts and
vulnerable services that are manually created for each
event.  The  InCTF  Framework  [17] builds  on  iCTF
Framework  to  deploy  CTFs  and  teams’  exploits  on
Docker  containers.  While  these  various  frameworks
lower the barrier for hosting CTF events, the challenges
are typically static, and as a result challenges are often
not  publicly  published,  and  as  such  each  new  CTF
event  involves  manually  creating  new  challenges.
Furthermore,  most  frameworks  are  geared  towards
jeopardy-style CTFs with either one or no hints, and no
existing framework mets our aims, as discussed in the
following section. 
CyTrONE  is  a  framework  that  aims  to  automate
environment  setup  tasks  for  security  education  [30].
CyTrONE has a management UI, integrates with LVEs,
and YAML specifications state software to install and
run, and can include questions and answers to present to
users.
Previous  work  to  provide  randomisation  to  security
challenges  includes  PicoCTF-Platform  2,  which
includes  automatic  problem generation (APG),  where
permutations of challenges can be generated on a per-
team  basis  (or  allocated  from  polls  of  instances  for
improved scalability), and served to teams via the web
interface  [7]. This approach could be used to generate
dynamic  challenge  content  (as  APG  been  applied  in
other disciplines  [31]); however, PicoCTF 2014 solely
used APG to detect and prevent cheating by generating
different  flags  per-team  [7].  Attempts  to  share  flags
were detected 1081 times (0.84%).  Chothia et.  al  [2]
devised  a  CTF  system  to  prevent  flag  sharing  by
automatically  generating  separate  flags  (based  on
public key  cryptography) per-student  in  a  single  VM
that  is  distributed  to  students.  Feng  developed
MetaCTF  [6],  which  provides  polymorphic  and
metamorphic  reverse  engineering  challenges  so  that
students  are  given  unique  challenges,  and  which  is
designed  around jeopardy-style CTF challenges  for  a
HE  curriculum,  with  a  scaffolded  progression  of
exercises. Other randomisation of reverse engineering
security  challenges  includes  Tigress,  which  provides
dynamic obfuscation of C code [32].
The authors  are not  aware of  any  other  projects  that
provide  randomisation  at  the  system/VM  level  for
generating randomly vulnerable systems.
3. Aims and Methods
3.1. Overall Aim
The  overall  aim  for  for  this  work  was  to  provide  a
randomizable, flexible, and general purpose method for
specifying and generating VMs for security education
and training purposes. 
3.2. Use Cases
The educational use-cases include:
● simulations  of  organisations  with  a  mix  of
secure and insecure services; with desktop and
servers; for simulated security audits;
● security lab exercises; and, 
● challenges  for  CTF  events  or  CTF-style  lab
work. 
3.3. Rich-Scenarios
To achieve these ambitious use-cases, rather than focus
on  generating  standalone  jeopardy  challenges in  the
form  of  individual  files,  the  aim  of  this  work  is  to
output a set of VMs, representing rich-scenarios. Each
rich-scenario can include:
● One or more systems (VMs)
● Complete operating systems, including server
and desktop systems
● Networked  configuration,  including  multiple
network segments
● Network services (such as FTP, IRC, HTTP,
NFS)
● System  configuration  (such  as  users  and
accounts, and software installed)
● Files  representing  thematic  content,  such  as
themed websites
● Software vulnerabilities (including in-the-wild
software  vulnerabilities,  and  randomly
generated  vulnerabilities  in  protocols  or
software/websites)
● Configuration  vulnerabilities  (including
misconfigured  access  controls  and  services,
weak passwords, and so on)
● Data  interpretation  challenges  including
steganography, encryption and encoding
● “Loot”,  such  as  flags  or  simulated  sensitive
data
● CTF-style  challenges  (where  solving
challenges  or  compromising  vulnerabilities
such as any of the above leads leads directly to
the discovery of flags)
3.4. Randomisation
Randomisation  and  modular  reuse  of  the  above
elements is a primary goal. Our aim is to randomise the
following:
● Selection:  randomised  selection of  the  above
elements.  For  example,  randomly  choosing
operating system(s), network configuration(s),
service(s),  system  configuration(s),  including
user  accounts  and  passwords,  with  random
selection  of  in-the-wild  vulnerabilities  or
security challenges.
● Parameterisation:  all  of  the  elements  should
be  able  to  be  configured  (for  example,  the
ports  services  should  use,  strength  of
passwords,  theme  of  the  scenario),  and  this
configuration will be randomizable.
● Nesting:  data  generation  (such  as  the
generation of random flags) and interpretation
challenges (such as encoding) should be able
to  be  combined/nested  in  randomised  ways.
For  example,  a  flag  can  be  randomly
generated, and then encoded in some random
way  before  being  leaked  via  a  random
software vulnerability.
3.5.  Specification  Language  and  Constrained
Randomisation
A further  aim is to design and implement a  scenario
specification  language,  that  will  randomly  generate
rich-scenarios for these use cases. Given the significant
diversity  in  potential  randomisation  implied  by  our
randomisation  aims,  it  is  important  that  the
specification  language  can  specify  the  inclusion  of
elements  and  constrain  randomisation  to  meaningful
and context appropriate selection, parameterisation, and
nesting.
The  specification  language  will  be  capable  of
representing the generation of unique security scenarios
based on a configurable set of optional constraints: for
example, a network of servers, with specific kinds of
services (such as a Web server and a file server) with
specific  kinds  of  software  or  misconfiguration
vulnerabilities (such as remote code execution and local
privilege escalation vulnerabilities). Vulnerabilities and
services  will  be  randomly  selected  and  installed  on
VMs, as specified. 
3.6. Student Engagement
The  project  aimed  to  engage  students,  both  in
development, and in using and evaluating the VMs and
learning environments that were generated. We aimed
to  use  our  framework  to  provide  rich-scenarios  for
penetration  testing  exercises,  and  to  introduce  new
university  student  hacking  teams  to  CTFs  and  as  a
stepping-stone  to  taking  part  in  international
competitions. 
3.7. Development Methodology
Software  design  and  development  was  led  by  the
primary-author,  with  a  cross-institutional  software
development  team  that  over  time  included  10
undergraduate students (6 employed, others working on
sub-projects),  1  postgraduate  MRes  student,  and  1
postdoctoral  researcher.  Additionally,  a  team  of
students  were  employed to  develop  a  range of  CTF-
style  challenges,  and  adapt  CTF  challenges  from
existing security labs (such as [2]).
The  software  was  developed  open  source  using  a
relaxed  Scrum methodology,  with  a  backlog,  regular
sprint  meetings,  and  task  assignment.  The  current
version was always available via Github, and typically
members of the team tested each other’s  code before
committing to the master branch. 
This approach was designed to engage our students in
developing  their  skills  beyond  their  taught  courses,
giving them experience in software development,  and
developing learning materials.
4. Security Scenario Generator (SecGen)
4.1. Introducing SecGen
Here we present Security Scenario Generator (SecGen),
which is designed to achieve all of the aims described
in Section 3. 
SecGen  is  a  Ruby  application,  with  an  XML
configuration language. SecGen reads its configuration,
including  the  available  vulnerabilities,  services,
networks, users, and content, reads the definition of the
requested  scenario,  applies  logic  for  randomising  the
scenario,  and  leverages  Puppet  and  Vagrant  to
provision the required VMs.
SecGen generates randomised vulnerable VMs that are
created  based  on  a  scenario  specification,  which
describes the constraints and properties of the VMs to
be created. For example,  a scenario could specify the
creation  of  a  system  with  a  remotely  exploitable
vulnerability  that  would  result  in  user-level
compromise, and a locally exploitable flaw that would
result in root-level compromise. This would require the
attacker to discover and exploit both randomly selected
vulnerabilities  in  order  to  obtain  root  access  to  the
system. Alternatively, the scenario that is defined can
be more specific,  specifying certain kinds of services
(such as FTP or SMB) or even exact vulnerabilities (by
CVE).
This work builds on an early prototype implementation
that demonstrated the feasibility of the combination  of
technologies  [33].  The system was  re-architected  and
advanced  features  were  implemented  to  achieve  our
ambitious set of aims, and which are described in the
following sections.
4.2. Architecture and Modularity
SecGen  leverages  a  number  of  virtualisation  and
automation  technologies,  including  Vagrant  and
Puppet. Vagrant, which is typically used by developers
to manage development environments  [34], is used to
provision  VMs,  Puppet,  which  is  typically  used  to
manage large scale deployments of servers [35], is used
to configure the VMs, and Librarian-puppet is used to
manage the deployment of the selected puppet modules.
The final output currently includes VirtualBox VMs.
SecGen  is  designed  to  be  highly  modular,  with  a
directory  structure  and  general  design  philosophy
loosely inspired by Metasploit’s modular structure. For
example, the modules/vulnerabilities/ directory
includes  modules  representing  various  vulnerabilities,
sometimes directly relating to Metasploit Framework’s
corresponding modules/exploits/ modules.
The underlying structure of SecGen is that of a number
of  “system”  objects,  which  represent  VMs  (with  a
Vagrant  basebox  that  is  selected  based  on  specified
attributes), and each is associated with a list of SecGen
“module” objects which are primarily selected based on
specified attributes. 
Each module has a type (such as vulnerability, service,
utility,  generator,  or  encoder),  module  path,  and  a
associative  array  of  attributes  (such  as  CVE number,
difficulty level, CVSS, and so on). Modules can receive
data  into  named parameters  (such  as  port_number  or
strings_to_leak),  either  from the  output  from another
module  or  from data  stored  in  a datastore  (variable).
Modules can output data, which can be directed at the
input  of  another  module’s  parameters  or  into  a
datastore.  Modules  can include Puppet  code which is
deployed to and executed on the VMs (as in the case for
vulnerability,  service,  and  utility  modules),  or  local
code which provides  randomisation or  transformation
of  data  (as  with  encoder  and  generator  modules).
Furthermore,  modules  can  have  default  inputs,  and
dependencies on or conflicts with other modules. 
Note  that  this  modular  structure  is  further  explained
with examples in the following sections.
There are two stages to running SecGen: 
Stage 1) building the project output.
Stage  2)  building  VMs based  on  the  project
output. 
At  Stage  1,  all  available  modules  are  read,  and  the
scenario definition is also read. The scenario definition
is used to select the modules to include for each system.
In  some  cases  modules  will  automatically  add  other
modules to the scenario: either due to a dependency or
as a default input to a parameter. 
All  randomisation  happens  at  Stage  1.  Modules  that
have local code are run to produce output, which is then
fed into other modules’ parameters. 
Librarian-puppet  is  then  used  to  deploy  all  of  the
puppet modules corresponding to the SecGen modules
that have been selected into the project output directory.
A Vagrantfile is created, which makes reference to all
the generated data and puppet modules. Other outputs
include  files  describing  the  generated  scenario,
including an XML file listing flags with corresponding
hints.
Stage 2 simply involves invoking “vagrant up”, which
leverages Vagrant to generate and provision the VMs.
4.3. SecGen Modules
The types of SecGen modules are: 
● base:  a  SecGen  module  that  defines  the  OS
platform (VM template) used to build the VM
● vulnerability:  a  SecGen module that  adds an
insecure,  hackable,  state  (including  realistic
software  vulnerabilities  known  to  be  in  the
wild or fabricated hacking challenges)
● service:  a  SecGen  module  that  adds  a
(relatively secure) network service
● utility: a SecGen module that adds (relatively
secure) software or configuration changes
● network: a virtual network card
● generator:  generates  output,  such  as  random
text
● encoder: receives input, such as text, performs
operations on that to produce output (such as,
encoding/encryption/selection)
The  root  of  a  module’s  directory  always  contains  a
secgen_metadata.xml  file  (illustrated  in  Figure  1),
which defines the attributes of the module. In the case
of vulnerability modules, this file contains information
about the vulnerability, including CVE, privilege level
the successful  attacker gains,  access  level required in
order to attack (remote vs local), any metasploit module
that  can  be  used  to  exploit  the  vulnerability,  CVSS
score and vector string, difficulty level, and description.
This information can be used to filter module selection
for  scenarios,  and  also  used  to  specify  modules  that
conflict  with  each  other  or  to  satisfy  dependencies
between modules.
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<vulnerability [snip]>
  <name>DistCC Daemon Command Execution</name>
  <author>Lewis Ardern</author>
  <module_license>MIT</module_license>
  <description>Distcc has a documented security weakness 
    that enables remote code execution.</description>
  <type>distcc</type>
  <privilege>user_rwx</privilege>
  <access>remote</access>
  <platform>unix</platform>
  <!--module inputs-->
  <read_fact>strings_to_leak</read_fact>
  <read_fact>leaked_filenames</read_fact>
  <default_input into="strings_to_leak">
    <generator type="message_generator"/>
  </default_input>
  <default_input into="leaked_filenames">
    <generator type="filename_generator"/>
  </default_input>
  <!--optional vulnerability details-->
  <difficulty>medium</difficulty>
  <cve>CVE-2004-2687</cve>
  <cvss_base_score>9.3</cvss_base_score>
  <cvss_vector>AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C   
  </cvss_vector>
  <reference>https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/
  exploit/unix/misc/distcc_exec</reference>
  <reference>OSVDB-13378</reference>
  <software_name>distcc</software_name>
  <software_license>GPLv2</software_license>
  <!--optional hints-->
  <msf_module>exploit/unix/misc/distcc_exec
  </msf_module>
  <hint>On a non-standard port</hint>
  <solution>Distcc is vulnerable, and on a high port 
    number.</solution>
  <!--Cannot co-exist with other installations-->
  <conflict>
    <software_name>distcc</software_name>
  </conflict>
</vulnerability>
Figure 1: secgen_metadata.xml
4.4. Scenario Specification
The selection logic for choosing the modules to fulfill
the  specified  constraints  can  filter  on  any  of  the
attributes  in  each  module's  secgen_metadata.xml  file
(for  example,  difficulty  level  and/or  CVE),  and  any
ambiguity  results  in  a  random  selection  from  the
remaining  matching  options  (for  example,  any
vulnerability matching a specified difficulty level). The
filters  specified  are  regular  expression  (regexp)
matches.
As illustrated in Figure 2, the default scenario defines a
scenario with a remotely exploitable vulnerability that
grants  access  to  a  user  account,  and  a  locally
exploitable root-level privilege escalation vulnerability.
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<scenario [snip]>
  <!-- an example remote storage system, with a 
    remotely exploitable vulnerability that can then 
    be escalated to root -->
  <system>
   <system_name>storage_server</system_name>
    <base platform="linux"/>
    <vulnerability privilege="user_rwx"
      access="remote"/>
    <vulnerability privilege="root_rwx" 
      access="local"/>
    <service/>
    <network type="private_network" range="dhcp"/>
  </system>
</scenario>
Figure 2: default_scenario.xml
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<scenario [snip]>
  <system>
    <system_name>file_server</system_name>
    <base platform="linux"/>
    <vulnerability module_path=".*nfs.*">
    <input into="strings_to_leak">
      <value>Leak this text and a flag</value>
      <generator type="flag_generator"/>
    </input>
    </vulnerability>
    <network range="dhcp"/>
  </system>
</scenario>
Figure 3: Module parameterisation
Parameterisation enables modules to be fed input. For
example, a vulnerability can be fed information to leak
as  output.  And  modules  can  be  nested,  so  that  the
output from nested modules are passed into the input
for the parent modules. SecGen module parameters are
analogous to named and (always) optional parameters.
For  example,  Figure  3  shows  a  system  with  a  NFS
share that will host a publicly exported file containing
leaked text, including a generated flag.
Figure 4 illustrates how the flag generator can be nested
within an encoder to first encode the flag before it is
leaked.
Generators and encoders will always produce/return an
(unnamed) array of strings,  which can be directed to
input parameters for other modules (by parameter name
into  modules  they  are  nested  under,  as  illustrated  in
Figure 4). All string encoders will accept and process
the "strings_to_encode" parameter, so it's safe to pass
input  into  any  randomly  selected  encoder.  It  is  also
possible to direct the output from multiple modules to
input  to  the  same  module  parameter,  by  nesting
multiple modules under an <input> element. In which
case each of the nested inputs to that same parameter
are concatenated into the same array of strings. 
 [snip]
<vulnerability module_path=".*nfs.*">
  <input into="strings_to_leak">
    <encoder name="BASE64 Encoder">
      <input into="strings_to_encode">
        <value>Leak this text</value>
        <generator type="flag_generator"/>
      </input>
    </encoder>
  </input>
</vulnerability>
 [snip]
Figure 4: Nesting encoders
Note  that  module  definitions  can  specify  a  set  of
(potentially nested) modules that should be selected for
input to a parameter, if an input is not specified in the
scenario.  This  is  illustrated  in  Figure  1,  where
strings_to_leak has a generated message as it’s default
value.
Other advanced features include methods for ensuring
modules  selected  are  unique,  and  using  datastores
(variables)  to  hold  values  for  reuse.  Datastores  are
similar  to  variables  in  other  languages.  However,  a
datastore always holds an array of strings, and writing
to  the  datastore  concatenates  to  the  array  of  strings.
Datastores can be used to store generated information
for complex scenarios, such as the organisation's name,
employees,  etc,  which  can  then  be  fed  through  to
websites, and services, user accounts, and so on. 
This specification language has proven to be a powerful
method  for  generating  meaningful  challenges  and
systems.  However,  through  our  experience  with
collaborative software development we concede it has a
steep learning curve to development. 
Access to existing scenarios makes SecGen's barrier for
entry low. This removes the requirement for end users
of the framework to understand SecGen's configuration
specification.  Scenarios  can  be  found  in  the
scenarios/ directory. Developed scenarios include a
set  of  VMs  for  a  randomly  generated  fictional
organisation,  with  a  desktop  system,  webserver,  and
intranet server, ready for a security audit; and a set of
VMs for hosting a CTF competition; and many other
example scenarios.
4.5. Implemented Functionality
Over  100  modules  have  been  implemented  to  date,
which  provides  functionality  that  makes  the  SecGen
framework  practically  useful.  11  service  modules
provide a range of secure services including NFS, IRC,
NTP, SMB, FTP, database, and web servers. 11 utility
modules provide various system configurations such as
user  accounts,  firewalls,  and  desktop  environment
configuration. 24 vulnerability modules provide a range
of vulnerable services,  such as  vulnerable NFS,  IRC,
SMB, FTP, SSH, web servers and web apps, vulnerable
desktop  configurations,  access  control  and  system
configurations, the majority of which can be deployed
either  as  CTF  challenges  or  to  provide  open-ended
simulations. 45 generator modules can provide content,
such as business and user names, addresses and email
addresses, messages, filenames and directories, images,
ssh  keys,  passwords,  and  CTF  flags.  13  encoder
modules  provide  various  forms  of  encryption,
conversion  between  data  formats,  and  encoding
methods. Network modules provide network cards for
scenarios  with multiple network segments.  The focus
has  been  on  deploying  Linux  systems;  however,  we
have had success testing Windows functionality, which
is in development.
4.6. Front End: CTF Website and Hints
A website has been developed to provide a front end to
SecGen generated VMs for  CTF events.  The website
provides a scoreboard, timer, flag submission, progress
indication, and hints.
SecGen  automatically  generates  a  marker.xml file,
listing  all  the  flags,  and  for  each  flag  a  list  of
corresponding  hints,  based  on  the  metadata  for  the
module. Hints range from general hints, such as trying
port scans, to progressively more specific hints all the
way  through  to  the  description  of  a  solution.  The
approach taken for hints was to penalise points for each
hint taken, although the penalties for hints will never
exceed  the  reward  for  submitting  the  flag.  Where
multiple  flags  are  behind  the  same  challenge  (for
example,  differently  encoded  flags  behind  the  same
vulnerability),  submitting  any  of  those  flags  unlocks
repeated  hints  (such  as  how  to  exploit  the
vulnerability).
5. Evaluation
5.1. Rich-scenarios and randomisation
SecGen  provides  a  platform  that  uniquely  and
demonstrably achieves the aims described in Sections
3.1 to 3.5. The framework can demonstrably generate
highly-randomised VMs based on rich-scenarios.
5.2. Experience Teaching Using SecGen
SecGen  has  been  applied  in  HE  to  provide  security
exercises,  from  small-scale  exploitation  exercises
through to open-ended audits of a complex set of VMs.
Recently a rich-scenario was developed which was used
to create targets for team-based security audit projects.
The scenario includes a web server, intranet server, and
desktop  system.  The  attacker  (Kali  Linux)  VM  was
placed on the same network segment as the webserver
(ie.  sharing the same virtual  network card),  which in
turn was connected to the intranet and desktop systems.
The  students  were  required  to  breach  the  webserver
before  pivoting  attacks  through to the  other  systems.
The  scenario  includes  a  generated  business  name,
manager,  and  employees,  and  involves  a  random
selection  of  secure  and  vulnerable  services  and
configurations.  A  security  audit  remit  was  also
generated  for  each  team.  Student  teams  followed  a
security  audit  methodology and completed  a writeup.
The output from SecGen was used to assist marking. 
5.3. CTF Using SecGen
SecGen was used to generate a set of VMs for use in
hosting a UK-wide full-day in-person CTF event.  59
students from 10 universities  competed.  3  VMs were
generated  for  the  event  using  SecGen,  including  one
with random decoding challenges, one with a random
set  of  vulnerabilities  and  image  steganography,  and
another  with  a  root-level  privilege  escalation.  At  the
end of the event SecGen was presented to participants.
An evaluation survey was run to gauge success of the
framework and the event. The response rate was 21 of
the 59 participants from 8 of  the 10 universities  that
took  part.  52%  were  postgraduate  students,  43%
undergraduate  (1  reported  “N/A”).  Many  were
completing the first year of their degree (38%). 
Satisfaction  of  the  event  was  good,  with  only  one
participant  responding  negatively  on  the  scale  of
satisfaction. A multiple linear regression analysis was
conducted  to  understand  whether  the  level  of
satisfaction with the event was impacted by the level of
study (not applicable/undergraduate/postgraduate), year
of  current  course  (not  applicable/first  year/mid-
course/final  year),  whether  they  had  taken  part  in  a
Capture  The  Flag  (CTF)  or  other  hacking  challenge
before (yes/no), level of knowledge and understanding
of  cybersecurity,  and  sex  of  the  participants
(male/female/prefer not to say).  All assumptions such
as  independence  of  residuals,  evidence  of
multicollinearity,  and  assumptions  of  normality  were
met.  Examining  all  of  the  independent  variables,  the
overall model that was found to have best fit of the data
has F (3,17) = 3.313, p < 0.05, R2 = 0.369, two of the
independent variables (stage of study and whether they
had taken part CTF before) have statistically significant
contribution in explaining variation (nearly 37%) of the
dependent variable (satisfaction with the event) with p
<  0.05.  Table  1  (below)  represents  regression
coefficients with standard errors.  The model suggests
that in general the participants who are at a later year of
study were  less  satisfied with the  event  compared  to
participants at earlier stages of study. The result might
support  the  view expressed  in  previous  research  that
there is a need to preserve balance between difficulty
and  ease  for  designing  security  competitions  with
respect  to  the  target  audience  [5].   The  higher
satisfaction amongst those that had participated in CTF
previously  perhaps  supports  the  findings  from
qualitative  data that  indicated an  appreciation for  the
uniqueness of the event such as the “attack-format” and
use of attack tools, which could be appreciated more by
the participants with past hacking challenge experience.
Table 1: Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on
Satisfaction
Variable B
SEB
β
Intercept 5.432 0.656
Level of study -0.322 0.302 -0.213
Year of study -0.425 0.169 -0.503*
CTF experience -0.825 0.355 -0.460*
Note: *p<.05; B=unstandardized regression coefficient; 
SEB=Standard error of the coefficient; =standardized coefficientβ
81% (n=18) reported that their level of knowledge and
understanding of cyber security increased as a result of
participating  in  the  event.  81%  also  expressed  an
interest in competing in similar events in the future (on
a 1-5 Likert scale M=4.43, SD=1.12), with positive but
slightly  lower  interest  in  online  team  competitions
(M=4.14,  SD=1.10),  online  individual  (M=4.10,
SD=1.13), and offline (M=3.67, SD=1.35). 
The difficulty level was good. During the one day event
no team completed every SecGen flag (min=1, max=18,
out of 21 possible flags). On a 5 point Likert scale of
too easy to too hard, 67% (n=14) selected ‘3’ (not too
easy or too hard) (M=3.10, SD=0.7). 
The  hints  system  received  a  mixed  response,  with
participants largely divided over how hints should be
implemented  in  a  CTF  event.  19%  thought  the  best
approach to hints was to have multiple hints per flag -
at  a penalty (as with the SecGen VMs), another 19%
prefered having one hint per flag with no penalty, 19%
prefer to have free hints from organisers directly, 14%
to have one hint per flag at a penalty, and 29% “Other”
with  various  comments,  including  an  indication  that
teams avoiding making use of  the hints,  or  that  they
found the hints unhelpful or too helpful.
Significantly, a large number of those who participated
responded that  they were interested in making use of
the SecGen framework in the future. 86% (n=19) would
compete  in  similar  CTF  events  using  SecGen  (1
answered  “No”,  1  other  “Not  sure”),  72% responded
they  were  interested  in  browsing  the  source  code  to
understand the challenges, 63% would use SecGen to
generate  VMs  as  personal  challenges,  59%  were
interested in  hosting their  own CTF events  using the
framework, and 55% were interested in contributing to
SecGen development. 
Qualitative  data  also  indicates  a  positive  experience.
Multiple  participants  noted  the  uniqueness  of  the
“attack-format”,  and  use  of  attack  tools,  which  was
compared to the usual jeopardy format.
Negative comments were focussed on the networking
issues  that  some  teams  faced,  when  configuring  the
VMs that were distributed to teams’ own laptops.
Following  the  event  the  authors  received  significant
interest in using SecGen to run further CTF events for
universities and schools.
6. Future Work
SecGen  benefits  from  the  development  of  further
modules  to  add  functionality,  such  as  more
vulnerabilities,  generated  content,  encoding  methods,
and CTF challenges. The authors are developing further
SecGen modules and still in the process of converting
CTF challenges that have been developed.
Work  is  in  progress  to  incorporate  further  digital
forensics  challenges,  and  output  to  forensic  disk
images,  such  as  E01  files.  Related  work  includes
incorporating  Microsoft  Windows  baseboxes  and
vulnerabilities  into  SecGen.  Work  is  also  ongoing  to
add cloud deployment of SecGen VMs, specifically to
an oVirt-based lab infrastructure. Work is also ongoing
to further integrate lab sheet based lab exercises, with
randomised worksheets. The platform will be extended
with further gamification and immersive scenarios.
7. Conclusion
SecGen  provides  a  flexible  and  highly  modular
framework  that  generates  VMs  based  on  scenario
definitions  that  can  include  randomisation  of
vulnerabilities  (from  in-the-wild  software
vulnerabilities  and  misconfiguration,  to  randomised
CTF-style  challenges),  secure  services  and
configuration,  and  content  that  can  be  generated  and
encoded  to  provide  meaningful  rich-scenario  style
challenges.  SecGen  has  been  successfully  used  to
enhance security  education,  by  providing  randomised
targets  for  lab  exercises,  large  team  project  security
audits,  and  for  generating  CTF  competition  VMs.
SecGen  can  be  used  to  overcome  the  challenges  of
generating  unique security  challenges  (and  the  issues
inherent when not randomising tasks given to students),
and is free and open source software (FOSS), ready for
use in security education. The authors have clear plans
for continued development and future work.
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